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Abstract:  
 
Looking at general, the company will hedge when the amount of foreign debt rises along with  
fluctuations in foreign exchange rates.  
 
However, this is not the case with the non-financial sector companies in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange, which shows a decrease in the use of derivative instruments compared to financial 
sector companies during the period 2014-2016.  
 
Τhe study aims to analyze the effect of internal factors on hedging policies through the use of 
derivative instruments in nonfinancial companies in the period 2014-2016, by putting the 
firm size as a control variable. The logistic regression analysis is used to test the antecedents 
of the hedging policy from the selected sample.  
 
The result shows that the liquidity and cash flow volatility have a significant positive effect 
on the use of derivative instruments. Meanwhile, dividend payout ratio, managerial 
ownership, leverage and the growth opportunity have no significant effect on hedging policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Hedging in the financial term can be interpreted as an investment method to reduce 
or eliminate the risk in another investment activity (Stulz, 2013). The principle of 
hedging itself is to cover the loss of the initial asset position with the advantage of 
the hedging instrument position. Massa and Simonov (2006) argued that hedging is a 
tool to manage risk, in which investors hold financial assets at risk to offset the risks 
of their non-financial income. 
 
One of the most commonly used ways of implementing hedging policies is by using 
an instrument derivative (Cusatis & Thomas, 2005). The types of assets that can 
serve as underlying assets can vary greatly, ranging from securities such as stocks 
and bonds (Avellaneda, Levy, & Parás, 1995; Laksana, Hersugondo, Wahyudi, & 
Muharam, 2017; Merton, 1976), commodities (Figlewski, 1984; Georgiev, 2001; 
Junkus & Lee, 1985; Schwartz, 1997), forex (Allayannis & Ofek, 2001; Garman & 
Kohlhagen, 1983; Glen & Jorion, 1993) and other derivative instruments. However, 
in order to minimize the risk of foreign exchange fluctuations, hedging policies are 
conducted through foreign exchange derivative instruments such as forward 
contracts, futures contracts, currency options and currency swaps (Eun & Resnick, 
1988; Feiger & Jacquillat, 1979; Hill & Schneeweis, 1981). 
 
A manager can use financial policies to communicate with the external investors 
(Laksana & Hersugondo, 2016; Palepu, Healy, & Bernard, 2004). In addition to that, 
the implementation of hedging policy is considered more valuable because it can 
show the internal activities that can increase the value of the company. The hedging 
strategies itself with derivative instruments are performed to optimize the risk 
management processes in the company (Graham & Rogers, 1999). The internal and 
external factors in firms have an effect in the implementation of hedging policies 
(Allayannis, Lel, & Miller, 2012). The external factors that can affect hedging policy 
are exchange rate fluctuations and total foreign debt owned by the company. 
 
Figure 1. The movement of rupiah’s exchange rate to us dollar, 2010-2014 
 
Source: Own elaboration, with data from www.idx.co.id (2018). 
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Figure 1 shows the fluctuations in the rupiah’s exchange rate against the dollar per 
quarter of 2010-2014. During the annual period of January 2010 to January 2011, 
rupiah tended to strengthen against the US dollar, but since April 2011 - January 
2014, it tended to weaken against the US dollar exchange rate. The peak of its 
weakening against the dollar was in the period of January 2014 which reached more 
than IDR.12.000 per dollar. The changes in exchange rates cause firms to face some 
exposure, such as transaction exposure (Martin & Mauer, 2003), accounting 
exposure (Aggarwal, 1991), operating exposure (Pantzalis, Simkins, & Laux, 2001). 
 
Figure 2. The curve on the foreign debt from non- financial companies by “the 
borrowing group” (in million dollars), 2010-2014 
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Source: Own elaboration, with data from www.idx.co.id (2018). 
 
Figure 2 shows the movement of foreign debt from non-financial sector companies 
in Indonesia to foreigners from 2010 to 2014. There are four categories of 
nonfinancial companies that lend to foreign parties, namely national private, mixed 
private, foreign private and state-owned enterprises known as “Badan Usaha Milik 
Negara”. It is known that the level of debt in non-financial companies in Indonesia 
tended to increase from 2010-2014. This indicates that non-financial corporations in 
Indonesia routinely and intensively seek additional funding for their companies to 
support their operational and investment activities. Increasing the amount of non-
financial corporate debt each year will increase the risk that may be faced by the 
company. One of the risks is the liquidity that keeps the company from issuing its 
cash reserves to repay the debt, leaving the company illiquid. A much worse risk is 
when the higher level of debt is accompanied by an increase in the exchange rate of 
the fund provider. As a result, the amount of expenses to be paid will increase. 
Therefore, the level of foreign debt can be used as a reference by the company to 
conduct hedging policy or not. 
 
However, it turns out that until 2014 the number of companies conducting hedging 
policies with derivative instruments is still quite small, see the Table 1. 
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Table 1. The number of financial and non-financial companies which did not hedge 
with derivative instruments in indonesia stock exchange, 2010-2014 
Year Financial Companies Non-Financial Companies 
Total Percentage Total Percentage 
2010 48 60% 273 79.59% 
2011 47 61,04% 293 80.05% 
2012 49 59,76% 311 80.57% 
2013 44 54,33% 332 80.78% 
2014 41 51,25% 348 81.30% 
Source: Own elaboration, with data from www.idx.co.id (2018). 
 
Table 1 explains the percentage of nonfinancial companies that did not hedge from 
2010 - 2014 has increased from 79.59% to 81.30%, compared to financial sector 
companies that actually showed a decline. The number of non-hedging financial 
firms from 2010 to 2014 tends to decline from 60% in 2010 to 51.25% in 2014. This 
decrease indicates that financial firms tend to be more active in hedging policies 
over the past five years. Meanwhile, there is a tendency for nonfinancial companies 
not to conduct hedging policies within the last five years. 
 
The underlying phenomenon of this is very interesting to discuss seeing that there 
was fluctuation of currency exchange rates and the increasing amount of foreign 
debt experienced by nonfinancial sector companies. This study aims to examine 
what internal factors affect the hedging policy by using derivative instruments 
conducted by nonfinancial sector companies. The previous research on hedging 
derivatives, revealing the reasons for not including the financial sector firms in their 
research. It was to be said that the financial sector companies acting as derivative 
users and as market-makers or providers in foreign exchange derivative transactions 
(Allayannis & Ofek, 2001). Therefore, the support and motivation of financial 
companies in using derivatives can be very different from non-financial companies 
(Sprcic & Sevic, 2012; Triki, 2005). 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Internal Corporate Factors that Affect Hedging Policy: Empirical 
Evidence 
 
Hedging using derivative instruments is similar to buying insurance. The instrument 
provides protection against unexpected things in business, but sometimes the policy 
is used for speculative purposes in the market. The principle of hedging is to cover 
the loss of the initial asset position with the advantage of the position of the hedging 
instrument (Hague, 2004; Stulz, 2013). The previous research has identified the 
internal factors (liquidity, managerial ownership, dividend policy, leverage, cash 
flow volatility, and growth opportunity) of firms that affected hedging policies using 
instrument derivatives (Allayannis & Ofek, 2001; Ameer, 2010; Clark & Judge, 
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2005; Haushalter, 2000; Nance, Smith, & Smithson, 1993; Nguyen & Faff, 2002; 
Sprcic & Sevic, 2012), but the results are still ambiguous. 
 
One of the internal variables that influence the hedging policy is liquidity. The 
liquidity variable proved to have a significant positive effect on hedging policy with 
instrument derivative (Clark & Judge, 2005; Nance et al., 1993), while the finding 
was the significant negative effect (Nguyen & Faff, 2002). 
 
Another internal variable is managerial ownership.  Ameer (2010) and Afza and 
Alam (2011) proved that managerial ownership has a significant positive effect on 
hedging policy. When managerial ownership increases, managers tend to minimize 
the risks that may be received so as to increase the value of the company through the 
use of derivative instruments. However, there is also evidence that managerial 
ownership is not significantly related to hedging policies (Géczy, Minton, & 
Schrand, 1997; Haushalter, 2000). 
 
The company's dividend policy has also been linked to hedging, and proved to have 
a positive effect (Afza & Alam, 2011; Bartram, Brown, & Fehle, 2009). While the 
effect is negatively due to the higher dividend payout ratio of a company, so it 
caused the lower of the need to hedge for companies which do not lack of funds 
(Haushalter, 2000; Sprcic & Sevic, 2012). Leverage also becomes one of the 
determinants of the company in determining the implementation of hedging policy 
with derivative instruments. The significant positive effects on hedging policies are 
apparent when firms with foreign currency debts can experience losses from 
exchange rate fluctuations, so that hedging policies are undertaken to minimize such 
losses (Haushalter, 2000). The difference in results is shown by (Allayannis & Ofek, 
2001) and (Ameer, 2010) which showed the opposite results. The inconsistency of 
the results is also encountered in the effect of cash flow volatility on hedging policy. 
Marek-Klimczak (2008) found that cash flow volatility variables negatively affect 
hedging policy, where this is contrary to what Ameer (2010) has found. 
 
The influence of growth opportunity on hedging policy has also been studied 
previously. It was found that there was a significant positive influence between 
growth opportunity and hedging policy (Haushalter, Klasa, & Maxwell, 2007), or 
negative influence (Ameer, 2010; Shin & Stulz, 2000).  
 
2.2 The Internal Corporate Factors and the Hedging Policies 
 
The relationship between the company's internal factors and the company's hedging 
policy has been explored a lot. The following explanation will elaborate more in the 
relationship of each factor with hedging through the use of derivative instruments.  
 
Liquidity: Mello and Parsons (2000) examined the liquidity issues related to 
different hedging strategies that can affect a firm value. The purpose of hedging is to 
increase the company's financial flexibility. This can reduce the risk of costly 
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financial difficulties, the effective cost of external financial constraints, and 
maximizes the value of investments. Firms that do not have financial constraints do 
not benefit from hedging, and the higher the company's financial constraint the 
greater the potential value of the hedge. The value of hedging depends heavily on the 
design of its strategies. The optimal hedging can minimize the variability in the 
marginal value of the firm's cash balances (Mello & Parsons, 2000). In addition, 
companies can lower the probability of financial difficulty by having more liquid 
assets, ensuring that funds will be available to pay debt claims (Ameer, 2010). Then, 
firms with high levels of liquidity will be less likely to seek external funding in their 
corporate investment plans, as companies already have sufficient funds to their own 
investment programs (Nguyen & Faff, 2002). Companies with a high level of 
liquidity will be less likely to experience problems in settling their short-term 
liabilities, and vice versa. The more liquid the company then the tendency to apply 
the hedging policy will be smaller as well. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Liquidity negatively affects the corporate hedging policy.  
   
Managerial ownership: When the managers act as shareholders, they tend to 
increase the supervision of the policies undertaken by these companies to reduce risk 
exposure. That means the greater the proportion of asset ownership of managers, the 
more intense the money hedging policy is done. Managers who invest their wealth in 
the corporation will be motivated more to reduce the risk of the company compared 
to an unaffiliated and diversified shareholder (Smith & Stulz, 1985). Similarly, 
corporate managers who invest some of their own in-company wealth will seek to 
protect themselves from the risks that arise because their wealth becomes more 
sensitive to the firm's market value (Knopf, Nam, & Thornton, 2002; Spanò, 2007). 
Managers trying to minimize the impact of risks that could affect the rate of return 
on shares they have in the company. In addition, there are advantages of hedging 
that is able to minimize the uncertainty that could affect the value of the company. 
Thus, a high level of managerial ownership will increase the possibility of hedging 
policy. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Managerial Ownership positively affects the company's hedging 
policy.   
 
Dividend Policy: Nguyen and Faff (2002) argued that the availability of funds from 
the company's net income can be a substitution of hedging, meaning that the 
company is able to manage the risks faced by using other techniques. But the 
availability of funds from the company can not be a substitute of the hedging when 
its availability is less. The reducing availability of the fund is because the company 
decided to pay dividends to shareholders. Companies with high dividend payout 
ratios will use more hedging derivative policies because of the reduced availability 
of their funds to pay dividends to shareholders and to reduce financial constraints 
(Berkman & Bradbury, 1996; Reynolds & Boyle, 2005). 
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Hypothesis 3: Dividend payout ratio positively affects the company's hedging policy.    
 
Leverage: A large debt level can cause the company to face its liquidity problem in 
paying for operational or investment costs (Bartram et al., 2009; Haushalter, 2000), 
so it is necessary to reduce the company's inadequate liquidity or financial distress. 
The greater the risk of corporate default, it will lead to new problems such as 
increased capital costs, bankruptcy costs, agency costs and the creation of 
information asymmetry. Hedging action in the face of transaction exposure will 
increase in line with increasing leverage levels (Nguyen & Faff, 2002; Reynolds & 
Boyle, 2005). Companies that have transactional exposure will have debt 
denominated in foreign currencies and therefore they also have a risk of exchange 
rate fluctuations. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Leverage positively affects the company's hedging policy.  
   
Cash Flow Volatility: Volatile cash flow indicates the uncertainty over highly 
business revenues, thus it potentially causes financial risks. Companies that have 
high cash flow volatility have a greater incentive to benefit from hedging policies 
with derivative instruments (Ameer, 2010). This volatility is influenced by changes 
in exchange rates as well as by the operations of the company (exports and imports) 
(Bartram, 2008; Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993). 
 
Hypothesis 5: Cash flow volatility positively affects the company's hedging policy. 
 
Growth Opportunity: Companies with high growth rates need more funds in the 
future, especially external funds (one of them is debt) to meet the growth of 
investment (Laksana et al., 2017). However, debt carries a new risk for the 
company, as well as fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, inflation and interest rate 
increases. The increased risk exposure will encourage more on the intense hedging 
activities (Sprcic & Sevic, 2012). Allayannis and Ofek (2001) argued that firms with 
greater growth opportunities will face higher investment costs (fluctuations in 
interest rates, commodity prices, and exchange rates), thus it will be more motivated 
to implement hedging policies. An expensive external financing problem is a classic 
problem under the investment, in which shareholders decide to reject low-risk 
projects if they value that the economic benefits will turn to creditors (Froot et al., 
1993). Along with the rising risks faced by firms due to the impact of growth rates 
companies, then the probability of policy hedging will increase as well. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Growth opportunity has a positive effect on the company's hedging 
policy. 
 
Control Variables: This research incorporates the firm size variable as a variable 
control. The size of the company can be shown from total assets ownership, total 
sales, average total sales and average total assets (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; 
Judge, 2015; Ramlall, 2009). As the company grows, its activities are also 
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increasingly complex, along with the level of risk facing the company. The large 
companies have a better control over market conditions and have more resources 
than small firms, so that companies are able to face economic competition and tend 
not to be vulnerable to economic fluctuations (Perrow, 1993). Reynolds and Boyle 
(2005) said that having the principle of economies of scale, large companies will 
tend to hedge more often due to the large scale of business transactions. 
Furthermore, large companies or multinational corporations will also be hedging 
more due to the more complex operational activities and exposure to changes in 
foreign currency exchange rates than the small firms. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
3.1 Model Specification and Methodology 
 
To test the determinant of hedging policy using instrument derivative, logistic 
regression analysis technique will be assisted by the SPSS version 23 program. 
Logistic regression has a dependent variable in the form of dummy variables (0 and 
1), and does not require classical and normality assumption such as multiple linear 
regression analysis, while screening data outliers can still be done. In general, the 
logistic regression model equation is expressed as follows (Hair, Black, Babin, & 
Anderson, 2010): 
   
 
(1) 
 
0+ b1x1+ b2x2+.....+ bnxn (2) 
 
Where: P is the probability of the dependent variable; e is a natural logarithm; 0 
represents regression control; b1, b2, ...., bn is the regression coefficient; and x1, x1, 
..., xn as independent variables.  
 
An analysis of logistic regression model testing (Gujarati & Porter, 2003) begins 
with assessing the overall fit model on data. The statistics used are based on the 
likelihood function. The likelihood L of the model is the probability that the 
hypothesized model represents the input data. To test the null and alternative 
hypothesis, L is transformed to -2LogL. Statistics -2LogL is sometimes called 
likelihood ratio 2 statistic, where 2 distribution with degree of freedom n - q, q is 
the number of parameters in the model. Hosmer and Lemeshow's Goodness of Fit 
Test are used to test the null hypothesis where the empirical datafits with the model. 
If the statistical value of Hosmer and Lemeshow's Goodness of Fit test is greater 
than 0.05, then the null hypothesis is rejected which means there is a significant 
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difference between the model and the observed value, or the model can not predict 
the observed value, and vice versa. 
 
The next step it will be prepared the 2x2 Classification Table to calculate the correct 
and incorrect estimation value. The columns represent two predictive values of the 
dependent variable and this is susceptible (1) and not vulnerable (0), whereas the 
line indicates the actual observation value of the dependent variable (1) and not 
susceptible (0). In the perfect model, all cases will be on the diagonal with 100% 
accuracy forecasting. If the logistic regression model has homoscedasticity, then the 
correct percentage will be the same for both rows.  
 
3.2 Data  
 
The data used in this study is the annual data during the period 2010-2014, where it 
was obtained from the website of www.idx.co.id, Indonesia Capital Market 
Directory (ICMD), and Laboratory of Bloomberg. There are three kinds of variables; 
dependent variable, independent variable, and control variable. The dependent 
variable is hedging policy by using derivative instrument; represented by the dummy 
variable "1" if the company hedges with derivative instruments and "0" if the 
company does not hedge by using derivative instruments. The "dummy" variable is 
used to determine the probability level of hedging policy decision making in 
nonfinancial companies. The independent variables in this research are Liquidity 
ratio (LQ), Managerial Ownership (MO), Dividend Payout Ratio (DPR), Leverage 
(LEV), Cash Flow Volatility (CFV), and Growth Opportunity (GO); and the control 
variable in the form of Size. The proxies of each of these variables are presented in 
the following table.  
 
Table 2. Variables and measurement  
NO. VARIABLE MEASUREMENT REFERENCE 
1. Hedging Policy Doing hedging = “1” 
No doing hedging= “0” 
 
2. Liquidity (LIQ) Current Ratio = Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities 
 
Nguyen and 
Faff (2002) 
3. Managerial 
Ownership 
Managerial Ownership= ((the number of 
shares owned by directors)/(Outstanding 
shares))X 100% 
 
Nguyen and 
Faff (2002); 
Reynolds and 
Boyle (2005) 
 4. Dividen Policy 
(DPR) 
Dividend Payout Ratio= Dividend per 
share/Earning per share 
Reynolds and 
Boyle (2005); 
Afza and 
Alam (2011) 
5. Leverage Debt Equity Ratio = Total debt/Total equity Allayannis 
and Ofek 
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There are 27 non-financial sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
data in 2014-2016 which become the samples of this research. The sample is 
selected by using purposive sampling with the criteria: the company has a complete 
information in the audited and adequate annual financial statements; the company 
has assets and derivative debt in the balance sheet report for hedging purposes. 
While natural hedging and non-formal hedging strategies other than derivative 
instruments are not included in hedging decisions; the company has exposure to 
foreign currency transactions in its financial statements. 
 
4. Analysis of Results 
 
During the study period, obtained data as much as 27 x 3 = 81 data. In accordance 
with the objectives of the study, the overall observation will be seen firstly to the 
condition of the use of derivative instruments in implementing the hedging policy. 
Out of 81 from the observation data, 27 samples (34.6%) have conducted hedging 
policy in protecting their financial risk. The remaining 53 samples (65.4%) did not 
conduct hedging policy with derivative instrument as an alternative choice in 
protecting their company's financial risk. 
 
Table 3. Hedging using derivative instruments, 2014-2016 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Source: Own elaboration, with data from www.idx.co.id (2018). 
 
(2001); Afza 
and Alam 
(2011) 
 6. Cash Flow 
Volatility 
(CFV) 
Cash flow Volatility =  Standard deviation 
  from net cash inflow operation for 3 
years before observation year. 
Ameer (2010) 
7. Growth 
Opportunity 
(GO) 
MVE/BVE= (Outstanding shares × 
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)/𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒quity 
Ameer (2010) 
8. Firm size 
(SIZE) 
Firm Size = Ln (Total Assets) Allayannis 
and Ofek 
(2001); Afza 
and Alam 
(2011) 
Method Total 
Sample 
Percentage 
Not doing derivative hedging  53 65.4% 
Doing derivative hedging  28 34.6% 
Total 81 100% 
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To obtain an overview of the data for this research, the following centered 
dimensions are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Variabel Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
LIQ 0.39 9.72 2.18 1.52 
MO 0.00 15.94 2.59 4.28 
DPR 0.20 85 36.74 18.70 
DER .15 3.56 0.99 0.78 
CFV 7.52 15.71 12.15 1.81 
GO 0.14 6.94 2.68 1.60 
SIZE 25.69 33.1 29.52 1.79 
N 81    
Source: Own elaboration, with data from www.idx.co.id (2018). 
 
The overall sample shows an average liquidity of 2.18x, meaning that the average 
sample has a current asset amount of 218% compared with current liabilities, with 
the distribution of 1.52. The highest level of liquidity is at PT. Media Nusantara 
Citra Tbk in 2014 amounted to 9.72x while the smallest level of liquidity obtained 
by PT Metropolitan Kentjana Tbk in 2013 amounted to 0.39x. The average 
managerial ownership is 2.59 or 2.58%, the standard deviation of this variable is 
greater than the average of 4.28 which indicates that the data of this variable is more 
dispersed. The largest level of managerial ownership is obtained by PT Adaro 
Energy Tbk in 2012 (15.94%) while the smallest level of managerial ownership 
obtained by PT Kimia Farma (Persero) Tbk in 2013-2014 (0.0023%).  
 
Meanwhile, the average dividend payout ratio (DPR) is 36.74% with a standard 
deviation value smaller than the average that is equal to 18.73. The largest level of 
DPR is owned by PT Indo Tambangraya Megah, Tbk in 2013 (85%), while the 
lowest is owned by PT Kimia Farma (Persero) in 2014 (0.20%).  
 
Table 4 shows that the average Debt Equity Ratio (DER) is 0.99x, with a standard 
deviation of leverage that is lower than the average of 0.78. The largest leverage rate 
is at PT XL Axiata Tbk in 2013 (3.56x), while the lowest obtained by PT Mandom 
Indonesia Tbk in 2012 (0.15x). The calculation of the standard deviation of the 
company's cash flow flows from 2014-2016 is obtained by 1.81. A lower value than 
the average (12.14) indicates that the volatility of cash flows is evenly distributed. 
The maximum value obtained by PT Astra International, Tbk in 2013 (15.71), while 
the minimum value obtained by PT. Pool Advista Indonesia, Tbk in 2012 (7.52). 
The growth opportunity proxies using MVE / BVE (market value equity / book 
value equity) ratio shows the average of 2.68x, meaning that this figure is bigger 
than the standard deviation (1.60). The highest profit opportunity is obtained by PT 
Indofood, Tbk in 2013 (6.94x), while the lowest is PT Samudra Indonesia Tbk in 
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2013 (0.14x). Furthermore, the average Ln total assets is 29.52 where the lowest 
value of PT Pool Advista Indonesia, Tbk in 2012 (IDR 143,65 Billion) and the 
maximum value is PT Astra International, Tbk in 2014 (IDR 236,029 Billion). 
 
4.1 Model Feasibility Test 
 
The initial stage in logistic regression analysis is to assess the overall fit model of 
the data to determine whether the model fit with the data or not. Based on the test, it 
is expected that H0 should not be rejected for the fit model with the data. To test the 
hypothesis, it is necessary to analyze the -2 Log Likelihood on the first block (Block 
0: Beginning Block) and second block (Block 1: Method = Enter). In addition to 
analysis of Log-Likelihood (-2LL) values, an analysis of Hosmer and Lemeshow's 
Test can also be performed to assess the fit model. If the value of Hosmer 
Lameshow's Goodness of Fit Test ≤ 0.05, then the null hypothesis is rejected, 
meaning there is no difference between data estimation logistic regression model 
with observation data. The model fit test can be seen in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Model fit test 
Source: Own elaboration, with data from www.idx.co.id (2018). 
 
Model 1 shows a statistical value of -2 LL 104,446 without entering the variable, it 
is only constant, but after the variable is inserted, the value of -2 LL decreases to 
60,842. Model 2 shows a statistical value of -2 LL of 104,446 (inserting constants 
only), but after entering the variable the 2 LL value drops to 61,131. The value of 
Cox & Snell R Square in model 1 is 0,416 and the value of Nagelkerke R Square is 
0,575; in model 2 the values are 0,414 and 0,572, respectively.  
 
So when the control variable is included in the test in order to increase the 
explainability of the independent variabl to the behavior of the dependent variable 
(hedging), then model 1 is rated better than model 2. Table 5 also shows the output 
of model 1 Hosmer and Lemeshow's Goodnessof Fit Test of 10,091. The significant 
Model Fit Test Model Fit Result of Model 1 Result of Model 2 
-2 Log Likelihood 
  
-2LLBlock 
Number:0 
104,446 104,446 
-2LLBlock 
Number:1 
60,842 61,131 
Cox &Snell R Square Cox &Snell R 
Square 
0,416 0,414 
Nagelkerke R Square Nagelkerke R 
Square 
0,575 0,572 
Hosmer and Lemeshow's 
Test 
Chi Square 10,091 9,886 
  p-value 0,259 0,273 
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value of both models is more than 0.05, so it is concluded that models 1 and 2 are 
acceptable. 
 
4.2 Table of Classification 
 
The classification table for the two models is structured to measure the extent of the 
model's accuracy to predict the conditions. 
 
Table 6. Classification of model 1 and 2 
Observed Model 1 Model 2 
Predicted 
Hedging 
% 
Correct 
Predicted 
Hedging 
%  
Correct 
0 1 0 1 
Hedging 0 45 8 84.9 45 8 84.9 
1 9 19 67.9 11 17 60.7 
Overal %  79.0  76.5 
a. Constant is included in the model 
b. The cut value is .500 
Source: Own elaboration, with data from www.idx.co.id (2018). 
 
The classification table for model 1 shows the level of accuracy in predicting the 
condition that occurred at 79%, while model 2 is only able to predict the condition 
that occurred at 76.5%. That is, model 1 using independent variables and control 
variables is better used to predict than model 2 where it uses independent variables 
only. 
 
4.3 Hyphothetical Test 
 
Table 7 compares the models 1 and 2 in view of its effect on the dependent variable 
as follows. 
 
Table 7. The test result of logistic regression on both models 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
B Sig. Exp B Sig. Exp 
Constanta -15.042 0.047 .000 -11.532 0.002 .000 
LIQ -1.191 0.021 .304 -1.060 0.021 .313 
MO -0.035 0.687 .965 -0.030 0.725 .971 
DPR 0.028 0.154 1.028 0.027 0.159 1.027 
DER -0.363 0.438 .696 -0.425 0.352 .654 
CFV 0.975 0.005 2.650 1.087 0.000 2.965 
GO -0.404 0.061 .667 -0.406 0.058 .666 
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Source: Own elaboration, with data from www.idx.co.id (2018). 
 
In model 1, when control variables are included in the model, it is known that LIQ 
and CFV have an effect on hedging policies with hypothesized directions. And in 
model 2, when the control variables are removed from the model, it is also found the 
same result as in model 1. The second model shows that the existence of the control 
variable (SIZE) has not been able to improve the prediction of the independent 
variables to match the hypothesis built.  
 
However, EXP or Odds Ratio (OR) on each independent variable when the control 
variable is included or excluded from the model. The value of EXP shows the 
magnitude of the influence of a variable on its dependent variable. For example, the 
EXP of LIQ variables is 0.304 in model 1 and 0.313 in model 2. Companies with 
high liquidity tend to engage in hedging policies of 30.4% greater than firms with 
low liquidity (Model 1) and 31.3% larger than firms with low liquidity (Model 2). 
 
Referring to Table 7, we can formulate the logistic regression models (Models 1 and 
2) as follows: 
 
Ln =  - 15.042 – 1.191 LIQ  - 0.035MO + 0.028 DPR– 0.363 DER + 
0.758 CFV – 0.404 GO  + 0.164 SIZE 
 
 
(3) 
Ln   = - 11.532 – 1.160 LIQ – 0.030 MO + 0.027 DPR - 0.425 DER + 
1.087CFV – 0.406 GO 
(4) 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that the LIQ variable has a negative effect on the probability of 
hedging policy received. From the regression result, it can be explained that the 
relationship between the odds of the company with the probability of using hedging 
is if other independent variables are considered fixed, then the decrease of each unit 
of variable Liquidity will cause the probability with factor used 0.313 on model 1 
and 0.304 in model 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that managerial ownership (MO) has a positive effect on the 
probability of hedging policy which is rejected. Managerial ownership has a 
negative and insignificant influence on hedging policy with derivative instruments. 
 
Hypothesis 3 refers to DPR variable with a coefficient 0.028 (significance level  
0.154) in model 1 and 0.027 (significance level 0.159) in model 2, meaning that the  
dividend policy has no significant effect to company hedging policy. 
 
SIZE 0.164 0.584 1.178 - - - 
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Hypothesis 4 states that leverage has positive effect on hedging policy with 
derivative instrument which is rejected, because the coefficient of DER in model 1 
and 2 is not significant. 
 
Hypothesis 5 refers to CFO where in model 1 has a coefficient of 0.975 and in 
model 2 of 1.087 while both coefficients are significant. It is concluded that the CFO 
variable has a positive and significant effect on the probability of hedging policy. 
 
Hypothesis 6 refers to GO with a positive effect on hedging policy with derivative 
instruments which is rejected, because the GO coefficient shows the opposite 
direction that is hypothesized and not significant. 
 
Thus, this study uses firm size as a control variable, and has a coefficient of 0.164 
(significance level 0.584). Thus, FIFA has no significant effect on the probability of 
hedging policy on nonfinancial companies. The results show that whether or not the 
control variables in the model turn out to show consistent test results. 
 
5. Conclusions   
 
Based on the results of hypothesis analysis and testing, it can be concluded that: 
a) Companies with high liquidity tend to lower the probability of conducting 
derivative policies. 
b) Companies with shareholders in managerial positions have dividend policy, 
high leverage level and growth opportunity do not affect their probability to do 
derivative policy dealing. 
c) Companies with high operating cash flow volatility will increase the probability 
for derivative hedging policies. 
d) Results prove that firms with larger sizes do not find the probability of hedging 
policies compared to smaller companies. 
 
A research that has been done by the authors is only to test the internal factors of the 
company alone regardless of the external factors suspected to affect hedging 
derivative activity. Therefore, a future research can consider the foreign sales 
variables (Allayannis & Ofek, 2001) as well as tax (Singh & Upneja, 2007) in order 
to obtain more comprehensive findings on hedging policies using derivative 
instruments. 
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